Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Hungry Cities Partnership

Reports and Papers

3-2017

No. 06: The Informal Sector’s Role in Food Security: A Missing
Link in Policy Debates
Caroline Skinner
University of Cape Town

Gareth Haysom
African Centre for Cities

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/hcp
Part of the Food Studies Commons, Human Geography Commons, Politics and Social Change
Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Skinner, C. & Haysom, G (2017). The Informal Sector’s Role in Food Security: A Missing Link in Policy
Debates (rep., pp. 1-17). Waterloo, ON: Hungry Cities Partnership. Hungry Cities Partnership Discussion
Paper No. 6.

This Hungry Cities Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports and Papers at Scholars
Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hungry Cities Partnership by an authorized administrator
of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Discussion Papers


MARCH 2017

No. 6
THE INFORMAL SECTOR’S
ROLE IN FOOD SECURITY:
A MISSING LINK IN
POLICY DEBATES?
CAROLINE SKINNER1 AND GARETH HAYSOM2

caroline.skinner@uct.ac.za, African Centre for Cities, University of Cape Town, Private Bag X3
Rondebosch 7701, South Africa
2
gareth.haysom@uct.ac.za, African Centre for Cities
1

Abstract
This discussion paper aims to review what is currently known about the role played by the informal sector
in general, and informal retailers in particular, in the accessibility of food in South Africa. The review
seeks to identify policy-relevant research gaps. Drawing on Statistics South Africa data, we show that the
informal sector is an important source of employment, dominated by informal trade with the sale of food
a significant subsector within this trade. We then turn our attention to what is known about the informal
sector’s role in food sourcing of poorer households. Surveys show that urban residents, and particularly
low-income households, regularly source food from the informal sector and we explore possible reasons
for this through an expanded view of access. We then consider existing evidence on the implications of
increased supermarket penetration for informal retailers and food security. Having established the importance of the informal sector, we turn our attention to the policy environment. First we assess the food
security policy position and the post-apartheid policy response to the informal sector – nationally, in
provinces, and in key urban centres. We trace a productionist and rural bias in the food security agenda
and argue that the policy environment for informal operators is at best benign neglect and at worst actively
destructive; with serious food security implications. Throughout the paper, we draw on regional and
international evidence to locate the South African issues within wider related trends.
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Introduction
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) defines food security as a situation in which
all people, at all times, have physical, social and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious
food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 1996).
This definition suggests that food security has four
critical dimensions: availability, access, utilization,
and stability. Food security debates have unduly
focused on food availability. Crush and Frayne
(2011a: 544) argue that the new global and African
food security agenda is “overwhelmingly productionist and rural in its orientation, and is based on
the premise that food insecurity is primarily a rural
problem requiring a massive increase in smallholder
production.” They go on to note that this agenda
is proceeding despite “overwhelming evidence of
rapid urbanization and the growing likelihood of
an urban future for the majority of Africans.” In
a subsequent article, Crush and Frayne (2011b:
781) expand on the notion of access, noting that
it “hinges primarily on the individual or household’s ability to purchase foodstuffs, which in turn
depends on household income, the price of food
and the location of food outlets.”
In cities throughout the Global South, the informal
sector plays a central role in making food more
accessible to the urban poor. This discussion paper
starts by reviewing the international context,
including urbanization trends and the latest estimates on the size and contribution of the informal
sector. The urbanization trends confirm Crush and
Frayne’s (2011a) contention that an urban future
is likely for most Africans, and the informal sector
trends suggest that informal work is a key source
of non-agricultural employment in most regions
of the Global South. Attention then turns to the
South African informal sector, which is a significant source of employment in the country. The
informal sector plays an important role in generating household income, which is in turn a key
determinant of food accessibility. The paper then
outlines the informal sector’s role in food sourcing
by poorer households.

After demonstrating that the informal sector plays
a significant role in food security, the paper turns
to the policy environment. It assesses food security
policy in South Africa and the post-apartheid government’s response to the informal sector, nationally, in provinces, and in key urban centres. The
paper traces a productionist and rural bias in the
food security agenda and argues that the policy
environment for informal operators is, at best, one
of benign neglect and, at worst, actively destructive; with significant negative implications for food
security.

International and Regional
Context
Cities in the South will absorb 95% of urban
growth in the next two decades and by 2030 will
be home to almost 4 billion people (or 80% of the
world’s urban population) (UN Habitat 2007).
Urban growth will be most intense in the cities
of Asia and Africa. About 50% (±750 million) of
Africa’s population is likely to be living in urban
areas by 2030. Southern Africa is currently one of
the fastest urbanizing regions in the world (UN
Habitat 2008). African cities are characterized by
high levels of informality. The type and nature of
the African urban transition is such that old models
suggesting that industrial opportunities will provide employment in industrial urban centres (and
employment to recent rural migrants) are not valid
in the African city. Pieterse (2008), Swilling (2011)
and Simone (2010) refer to this as the “second
urban transition”, which requires new ways of
understanding the urbanization process, and reconceptualizing how the urban economy functions.
Dualistic ideas of an economically marginal
“informal sector” – used temporarily by desperate
people as a survival strategy until they can access
the “formal sector” – are inappropriate in the new
urban reality. Informality is a permanent condition
for many new urbanites, and defines the landscape,
politics and economy of contemporary African cities
(Potts 2007, Simone 2004, Simone and Abouhani
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2005, Sparks and Barnett 2010, Tranberg-Hansen
and Vaa 2002). As Simone (1999) argues:
[A]ccelerated urbanisation in Africa has produced
cities whose formal physical, political and social
infrastructures are largely unable to absorb, apprehend or utilise the needs, aspirations and resourcefulness of those who live within them. As a result, the
efforts to secure livelihoods depend on informalised
processes and a wide range of provisional and ephemeral institutions which cultivate specific orientations
toward, knowledge of, and practices for, dealing with
urban life [and] the majority of Africans live in periurban and informal settlements often at the physical,
if not necessarily social, margins of the city.
The extent and importance of informality in
African cities is often underestimated. In most
African cities informality is now the “main game
in town” (Kessides 2005). As a proportion of total
employment (excluding in agriculture), informal
sector employment amounts to 65% in East and
Southeast Asia (excluding China), 53% in SubSaharan Africa and 34% in Latin America (Vanek
et al 2014: 10). Although individual incomes are
often low, cumulatively informal sector activities
contribute significantly to GDP. Rather than being
marginal, these activities are central to the economy
in many countries (Table 1).
TABLE 1: Contribution of Informal Sector to GDP
(excluding Agriculture)
Sub-Saharan Africa

%

Middle East and
North Africa

%

Benin (2000)

61.8

Tunisia (2004)

34.1

Togo (2000)

56.4

Palestine (2007)

33.4

Niger (2009)

51.5

Iran (2007)

31.1

Senegal (2000)

48.8

Algeria (2003)

30.4

Cameroon (2003)

46.3

Egypt (2008)

16.9

Burkina Faso (2000)

36.2

Note: GDP Excluding Agriculture
Source: Adapted from ILO (2013: 2)
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Within the informal sector, trade is the dominant activity, making up 43% of non-agricultural
informal employment in Sub-Saharan Africa and
33% in Latin America (Vanek et al 2014: 13). In
Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, 59% of women and
49% of men in non-agricultural employment work
in the informal sector (Vanek et al 2014: 10). The
importance of informal retail as an activity is evident
in the size of the street vending population in West
African cities, which ranges from 13% (Dakar) to
24% (Lomé) of those engaged in non-agricultural
informal employment (Table 2). Street vending
also accounts for a large share of women’s informal
employment (as much as 35% in Lomé and 28% in
Bamako). In most cities, more women are involved
in informal sector street trade than men. Indeed,
less than 10% of women in the labour force have
a formal job in West African cities (Roever and
Skinner 2016).
TABLE 2: Proportion of Informal Traders and
Street Vendors in West Africa
Informal traders
City

Total
%

Men
%

48.3

32.6

64.9

Lomé

44.6

20.8

Cotonou

43.8

19.7

Ouagadougou

42.9

Abidjan
Antananarivo

Bamako

Women
%

Street vendors
Total
%

Men
%

Women
%

19.9

12.0

28.2

62.7

24.0

9.6

35.0

61.6

18.8

7.9

26.9

37.0

50.1

16.7

17.1

16.3

40.5

23.1

56.6

16.0

8.2

23.3

33.5

31.6

35.3

15.3

13.2

17.3

Dakar

32.1

20.0

46.6

13.0

9.4

17.3

Niamey

31.9

28.8

36.7

13.5

12.9

14.4

Source: Compiled from Herrera et al (2012)

The informal sector plays a critical role in facilitating access to affordable and reliable food. Several
studies have examined the role played by informal
retailers in urban nutrition. Steyn et al (2013), for
example, review 23 studies (mostly conducted
in Africa) and assess the daily energy intake from
“street foods.” Overall they found that the daily
energy intake from street foods was 13%-50% in
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adults and 13%-40% in children. They also calculate that street foods contribute significantly to daily
protein intake, and often provide 50% of the recommended daily allowance (RDA). They conclude
that street foods make a significant contribution to
energy and protein intake in developing countries
and their use should be encouraged, provided they
are “healthy traditional foods” (Steyn et al 2013:1).

Size and Nature of South
Africa’s Informal Food Sector
This paper uses international definitional norms
in which the informal sector refers to employment
and production that takes place in unincorporated, small or unregistered enterprises and informal
employment refers to employment without social
protection through work both inside and outside
the informal sector. The informal economy refers to
all units, activities, and workers thus defined and
the output from them. In South Africa, Statistics South Africa defines informal sector workers
as (a) employees working in establishments that
employ fewer than five employees and who do not
deduct income tax from their salaries/wages; and
(b) employers, own-account workers and persons
helping unpaid in their household business who are
not registered for either income tax or value-added
tax (Stats SA 2016: xxiii).
According to Statistics South Africa, the informal
sector contributes an estimated 5.2% to GDP
(StatsSA 2015). A total of 2,565,000 individuals
worked in the informal sector in 2016 (Stats SA
2016: vi). This figure is far lower than in developing
countries of comparable size, but is still 16% of total
employment in the country. A total of 960,000
women work in the sector, which is 38% of total
informal sector employment, also lower than in
comparable countries and down from 45% in
2008 (StatsSA 2016: 2). Skinner and Rogan (forthcoming: 13) conclude that “informal trade has
traditionally been a bigger component of informal
sector employment, for women relative to men,
but much of the decrease in total female informal

sector employment occurred in wholesale and retail
trading between 2008 and 2014.”
Of those in the informal sector, 1,015,000 or
41% were working in trade, down from 46% in
2008 and 53% in 2000 (Essop and Yu 2008: 46).
Retail trade is therefore declining as a proportion
of total informal sector employment. The rapid
expansion of the formal retail sector is likely to be
a critical factor in the relative decline in employment in informal sector retail. Weatherspoon and
Reardon (2003) report that there were about 920
South African supermarkets in 2003, a number
that more than tripled to 3,167 only ten years later
(Vink 2013: 11). Informal retail is still dominated
by the food trade, although that too is in decline.
Devey et al (2006a) estimated that 72%-82% of
street traders in 2000-2001 sold food, while Rogan
and Skinner (forthcoming: 13) estimate that 67%
of street traders were selling food in 2014.
Official employment data is unlikely to capture all
international migrants in the country. Undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees are
largely excluded from the formal labour market and
have little option but to create their own employment (Crush et al 2015a). A 2010 Southern Africa
Migration Programme (SAMP) survey of Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town,
for example, found that 20% of all migrants were
working in the informal economy (Crush et al
2015b). Studies of other migrant groups, such as
refugees from Somalia, suggest much higher rates
of informal sector participation (Jinnah 2010).
Although there are no countrywide figures, case
studies suggest that informal food retail is a particularly important source of employment for foreign migrants (Gastrow and Amit 2015, Piper and
Charman 2016).
The informal sector is not isolated from, and does
not operate outside, the formal sector. The two are
closely linked with mutual trade and exchanges
between them. Research on the sourcing strategies of informal food retailers, for example, repeatedly shows that formal retailers (such as Shoprite,
Makro, and Metro Cash and Carry) are the dominant source of supply (Crush et al 2015a, Dube et al
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2013, Ligthelm 2005, Skinner 2005). A significant
proportion of the final sales for many big formal
retail players – including Massmart, Unilever and
South African Breweries – is the informal sector.
Plastow (2015), a retail industry insider, calculates
that about half of Massmart’s 2010 group sales came
from informal sector spazas. The supply chains of
key food and beverage “staples”, such as bread, soft
drinks, and beer, highlight the inter-dependence
of large-scale “formal” businesses and traders in
the informal sector (Charman et al 2013, Moore
School of Business 2005, Premier nd). Many large
firms engage with the informal sector in formal
business transactions and make deliveries and collections in accordance with pre-determined supply
schedules.

households patronize the informal food economy
almost every day and nearly two-thirds (59%) did
so at least once a week. The more food insecure
and poor households are, the more likely they are to
depend on the informal sector to secure food.

Food Access: The Informal
versus the Formal Sector

The AFSUN survey also provided important
insights into the patterns of supermarket patronage
and involvement in urban agriculture. The vast
majority of households purchase food from supermarkets, but many do so only once a month (Table
3). This is primarily because of the practice of bulk
buying of food staples from supermarkets. Only
22% of surveyed households grow some of their
own food. Just 8% of the respondents obtained
food from urban agriculture at least once a week
and only 3% at least once a month. Table 3 also
shows how the importance of informal markets
and street foods varies between cities - from a high
of 85% in Johannesburg to a low of only 42% in
Msunduzi (Caesar and Crush 2016).

Although the literature acknowledges the role
of informal food traders and street food vendors
in providing affordable and accessible meals for
low-income households, this is seldom quantified
(Skinner 2016). One exception is the research conducted by the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN), which included household food
security surveys in low-income areas in three major
South African cities. The survey found that 70%
of households normally source food from informal
outlets (Table 3). Nearly one-third (32%) of the

The differences between different parts of the same
city were not as significant as expected, given that
the sampled areas were deliberately chosen because
they differed from one another in terms of their
degree of housing formality. In Johannesburg,
for example, over 80% of surveyed households
sourced informal food in three different parts of
the city (Alexandra, the Inner City, and Orange
Farm). Patronage of the informal food sector did
vary by income across the city of Cape Town. A
food access typology using city-wide data shows

TABLE 3: Sources Normally Used to Obtain Food
Cape Town
% of households

Mzunduzi
% of households

Johannesburg
% of households

Total
0% of households

94

97

96

97

Small restaurant/shop/take away

75

40

80

68

Informal market/street food

66

42

85

70

Shared meals with neighbours and/or
other household

45

18

14

21

Food provided by neighbours and/or
another household

34

21

13

20

Borrowed food from others

29

24

6

21

Food transfers from rural household

17

24

14

28

5

30

9

22

Supermarket

Urban agriculture
Source: Adapted from Crush and Frayne (2011b: 799)
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considerable variation in patronage between households in different income terciles (Figure 1). The
majority of urban residents do purchase food from
formal outlets (supermarkets and smaller stores),
but those in the lower income terciles clearly do
so less frequently. On the other hand, households

in the highest income tercile buy food much less
frequently from informal sector vendors compared
with households in the middle and lowest terciles.
Over 80% of households in the lowest income tercile shop at spazas at least once a week and over 50%
do so almost every day.

FIGURE 1: Cape Town Food Access Typology by Income Tercile, 2013

Source: Hungry Cities Partnership

Despite growing supermarket penetration of
low-income areas (Battersby 2012a, Vink 2013),
the household survey data clearly shows that the
urban poor are highly dependent on food from the
informal sector. There are several possible reasons
for this dependence:
• Spatial accessibility: Street traders tend to gravitate towards areas with a lot of foot traffic, such as
commuter points (rail and bus stations, taxi ranks)
(Battersby 2016). Spaza shops are often evenly
distributed throughout townships and informal
settlements and are accessible on foot (Battersby
2016). This is clearly evident in mapping of

informal enterprises in multiple settlements by
the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (www.
livelihoods.org.za). By way of example, Figure
2 shows the locations of informal food outlets
in KwaMashu, Durban. This demonstrates both
the variety of types of outlet and their coverage
across the settlement. Crush and Frayne (2011b:
791) also note that where there is no, or erratic,
electricity and/or no refrigeration, fresh food
must be bought daily and physical proximity
becomes particularly critical. Methvin (2015)
found that location informed purchase for 49%
of households in Kanana in Cape Town, followed by price (42%), and quality (9%).
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FIGURE 2: Distribution of Spaza Shops and Other Food Retail Micro-Enterprises in KwaMashu,
Durban

Source: Reprinted with permission of Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (2015)
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• Competitive prices: Skinner (2010) compares
the price of 53 products sold by informal traders
in the Warwick Junction area in inner city
Durban with the price for the same products
in a range of formal retail outlets. On average,
the cost in formal shops was 76% more for the
same product and quantity (Skinner 2010). The
differences were particularly marked in the case
of fresh produce. For a basket of nine staple
goods including onions, tomatoes and potatoes,
consumers paid a 112-125% premium to purchase the same quantity of goods in their local
supermarket (Skinner 2010: 102-103). Other
studies have found that, while supermarkets in
poorer communities may offer cheaper prices for
staples, their fresh fruit and vegetable choices are
limited, of poorer quality, and more expensive
(Battersby and Peyton 2014). Informal fruit and
vegetable traders often locate near supermarkets
and offer a greater variety of fruits and vegetables
at lower prices (Cooke 2012).
• Breaking bulk: Informal retailers often break
their purchased bulk goods into smaller packages for resale. The practice of “breaking bulk”
means that consumers can purchase smaller
quantities of a product (Battersby 2012a). Low
and inconsistent household income and limited
storage space and refrigeration makes this an
attractive option for the urban poor (Methvin,
2015).
• Proximity to schools: Informal food traders
often locate close to schools in order to sell to
school children during their breaks (recess).
Poorer children often have to go to school early,
and without having had breakfast, because of the
lack of nearby schools. Many also have no lunchboxes and instead patronize fast food traders near
their schools (Lemon and Battersby-Lennard
2011). One study of 16 primary schools in the
Western Cape found that 49% had consumed at
least one item purchased from the school food
shop or a food vendor in the previous 24 hours.
The most frequent food shop/vendor purchase
was chips (crisps). Children who consumed
items from a food shop/vendor had a lower standard of living, leading the authors to conclude

that “lower income households may not always
have enough money to buy items needed to prepare a healthy lunchbox but may have enough
money to pay for...cheaper, energy dense snack
items” (Abrahams et al 2011).
• Access to credit: Studies of spazas (especially
those owned by international migrants) suggest
that offering food on credit is a key part of their
business model (Crush et al 2015a, Ligthelm
2005). By offering credit to regular customers,
informal vendors make it possible for poor
households to “buy” food without cash in times
of shortage (Battersby 2016).
More research is needed on the type and quantity
of goods that are purchased from formal as opposed
to informal retailers, and the perceived advantages
and disadvantages of both. Data from the Hungry
Cities Food Purchase Matrix from the HCP household survey in Cape Town should shed considerable
light on this question. Another approach would be
to look at a basket of basic necessities and compare
the sourcing strategies of low-income consumers
for these products. The PACSA food price barometer survey, for example, tracks food price inflation
for a basket of 36 basic foods frequently purchased
by low-income households in Pietermaritzburg in
South Africa (Smith and Abrahams 2015). However, little attention is paid to comparative costs at
different types of outlets. In Belo Horizonte, Brazil,
food prices are monitored across different food outlets and the data is widely disseminated through
the media, helping make the city a best practice
example of transparency about food prices (Rocha
and Lessa 2009).

Supermarket Penetration and
Informal Food Retail
In the past decade, supermarket expansion has been
extremely rapid in parts of East and Southern Africa.
The recent expansion of supermarkets into South
Africa’s low-income areas is well documented (Battersby and Peyton 2014, GAIN 2012, Magwaza
2013). Smaller supermarket chains – often former
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trading-stall-type operations such as Boxer – have
established themselves in some areas. In other areas,
larger stand-alone supermarkets from the major
chains operate. An emerging trend is mini-mall
developments, where an anchor supermarket tenant
is supported by several other retail operations such
as fast-food outlets, a furniture store (often offering
credit facilities), banks and a post office. Supporters
of supermarket expansion argue that their greater
purchasing power and economies of scale will benefit the urban poor because of lower prices, but
the evidence is mixed. For example, Battersby and
Peyton (2014:158) argue that:
The distribution of supermarkets is…highly
unequal and the distance of low-income from
high-income areas hinders access to supermarkets
for the urban poor. Supermarkets in low-income
areas typically stock less healthy foods than those in
wealthier areas and, as a result, the supermarkets do
not increase access to healthy foods and may, in fact,
accelerate the nutrition transition.
Some have expressed concern that the supermarkets have made highly-processed foods more accessible to the poor, both spatially and economically,
without increasing accessibility or reducing the
price of fresh produce (Igumbor et al 2012, Monteiro et al 2013, Reardon et al 2007).
The evidence is mixed on the impact of supermarket
expansion on the informal food sector. Kennedy et
al (2004: 1) argue that in a globalized food system
“competition for a market share of food purchases
tends to intensify with entry into the system of
powerful new players, such as large multinational
fast food and supermarket chains. The losers tend
to be the small local agents and traditional food
markets and, to some extent, merchants selling
‘street foods’ and other items.” However, country
and city level evidence suggests that the extent to
which supermarkets displace small traders is context
specific. Ligthelm’s (2008: 52) study of the impact
of shopping mall development on small township
retailers in Johannesburg found that the “net balance sheet on the impact of shopping mall development on small township retailers clearly suggests a
decline in the township retailers’ market share.” In
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Cape Town, however, there is evidence to suggest
a strong and co-dependent relationship between
street traders and the formal food system. One
example of this is the daily engagement of informal
traders with formal fresh produce markets (Ortiz
2015). Or again, fresh food traders often locate near
supermarkets in low-income areas because they can
sell their produce more cheaply at informal retail
facilities (Battersby 2016). A study of supermarket
penetration in Cape Town’s low-income communities found that supermarket expansion is “often
incompatible with the consumption strategies of
the poorest households, revealing the signiﬁcance
of the informal economy” (Peyton et al 2015: 36).
In Botswana, informal food retailing persists despite
the penetration of South African supermarkets but it
is unclear if informal retailers were more numerous
before supermarket penetration (Lane et al 2011).
Supermarket expansion into Zambia presents “a
considerable challenge to the claims that supermarkets transform food economies…[informal traders
are] progressively more resilient and competitive,
despite the growth of supermarkets” (Abrahams
2010: 115). In a Ghanaian study, informal traders
were found to be “important to the success of the
malls” (Oteng-Ababio and Arthur 2015: 151). This
body of emerging research suggests that supermarkets (often enclosed within shopping mall developments) are not necessarily delivering the food access
opportunities sometimes claimed. Supermarkets
are certainly a point of food access but they are
not the only “game in town” and are often used
interchangeably with the informal sector by poorer
consumers.
In order to better inform policy and planning around
supermarket penetration, more research is needed
on several questions including the following:
• What is the real impact of supermarket expansion on various types of informal retailers in the
short, medium and longer term and in different
contexts?
• What impact do supermarkets have on the type
of goods purchased and consumed and the
quantities purchased at different retail outlets,
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ranging from street vendors to large supermarkets?
• Where supermarkets are demonstrably impacting
on the viability of informal traders, what types
of traders are most affected in terms of gender,
store size, location and types of products sold,
and how does this change over time?
• Where formal and informal food retailers coexist,
what factors have led to this coexistence?
• How has supermarket expansion into townships impacted on the food security of the urban
poor?

Food Insecurity and Informal
Sector Policy Debates
The global commitment to addressing food
security was reaffirmed in the 2015 Sustainable
Development Goals (Fukuda Parr and Orr 2015).
At the national level, there are high levels of food
insecurity in South Africa. The South African
National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (SANHANES) found that 26% of households were experiencing hunger, and another 28%
were at risk (HSRC 2013). The equivalent figures
in urban informal areas were 32% and 36% respectively (HSRC 2013). The variance suggests that
urban food security is particularly high, a finding
consistently supported by other studies (Battersby
2011, Rudolf et al 2012, Caesar et al 2013). Everincreasing food prices and other price shocks suggest that urban food security is unlikely to improve,
especially considering the impact of the 2015-16
drought and anticipated downstream restructuring
of the entire food system; factors compounded by a
weak currency.
South Africa’s initial approach to food security
was informed by large national surveys in 1999
and 2005 that showed high levels of stunting and
underweight (Chopra et al 2009, Drimie and Ruysenaar 2010). Disparate government departments

(including Health, Social Development, and Agriculture) developed the Integrated Food Security
Strategy (IFSS) (DoA 2002), which was designed
to integrate various food security approaches into a
single inter-ministerial entity operating at multiple
scales. Despite laudable intentions, departments
operated in silos, limiting the implementation and
impact of the IFSS (Drimie and Ruysenaar 2010).
More recently, the National Development Plan
(NDP) expressly articulated food security as a key
strategic imperative (NPC 2012). The NDP offers
various perspectives on food security, including
recommendations to grow or procure sufficient
food to feed the nation from a calorific intake perspective; a supplementation approach through food
fortification; and a productionist approach linking
food security to land reform initiatives (NPC 2012:
231-232). The NDP speaks in very general terms
about food insecurity and provides little insight
into contextually-informed food security issues.
For example, no reference is made to the increasing
levels of food insecurity in urban areas, nor is there
any reference to the differences between formal and
informal areas highlighted by the HSRC (2013).
As Battersby (2012b) has noted, the rural bias in
planning reflects a skewed approach to food security.
This bias disproportionately focuses on production
as the primary means to respond to food insecurity
(Haysom 2015). The productionist approach only
considers one component of food security – availability. When this bias translates into policy, other
essential dimensions of food security are lost. The
rural bias is evident in South Africa’s 2002 IFSS,
the 2012 NDP and, most recently, in the 2013
National Policy on Food and Nutrition Security
(NPFNS) (DAFF 2013). All systematically ignore
other critical elements and determinants of food
security. When urban policy drafters and managers
do respond to urban food security issues, the tendency is to apply the same rural and productionist
lens. As a result, urban agriculture projects are the
dominant response. This approach misses deeply
entrenched food system problems and, as a result,
the root causes of food security are never addressed.
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National Government Policy on
the Informal Sector
In South Africa, the 1995 White Paper on the Development and Promotion of Small Businesses was one of the
first policy positions of the post-apartheid government (RSA 1995). While acknowledging survivalist and micro-enterprises as a component of small
business, the white paper was silent on the specific
needs of these smaller players. Ten years on, a review
of the impact of government’s small, medium and
micro enterprise (SMME) programmes concluded
that “existing government SMME programmes
largely have been biased towards the groups of small
and medium-sized enterprises and to a large extent
have by-passed micro-enterprises and the informal
economy” (Rogerson 2004: 765). An analysis of
the budgetary allocations for the informal sector
across all national government departments found
that although some departments had made progress
towards recognizing the informal economy, support measures were “few and far between, patchy
and incoherent, and largely ineffective…national
government lacks a clear and coherent policy toward
the informal economy” (Budlender et al 2004: 87).
President Mbeki’s address to the National Council
of Provinces in November 2003 introduced the
idea of a “second economy” and proved a watershed moment for national informal economy
policy. For the first time since the end of apartheid,
the informal sector was given a high profile. Mbeki
conceptualized the informal economy as follows:

informal sectors as “structurally disconnected.”
Devey et al (2006b: 242) argue that the “second
economy” arguments are based on the premise that
“the mainstream of the economy is working rather
well, and government action is needed to enhance
the linkages between the first and second economy
and where appropriate to provide relief, such as
public works programmes, to those locked into the
informal economy.”
Unsurprisingly, subsequent policy pronouncements suggested that the informal sector should be
eradicated. For example, the Accelerated Shared
Growth Initiative of South Africa, the next major
statement on economic policy imperatives, called
for the “elimination of the second economy” (RSA
2006:11). In 2008, the Presidency initiated the
Second Economy Strategy Project, which highlighted the extent to which “high inequality is an
outcome of common processes, with wealth and
poverty in South Africa connected and interdependent in a range of complex ways” and proposed various interventions (Philip and Hassen 2008, Philip
2009). Cabinet approved the strategic framework
and headline strategies arising from this process in
January 2009. However, when Mbeki was removed
as President in September 2008, his close association with the notion of the second economy meant
that the strategy itself arguably became a casualty.

The second economy (or the marginalised economy)
is characterised by underdevelopment, contributes
little to GDP, contains a large percentage of our
population, incorporates the poorest of our rural and
urban poor, is structurally disconnected from both
the first and the global economy, and is incapable of
self-generated growth and development.

The Medium Term Expenditure Strategy (MTES)
is the main guide to planning and resource allocation
across all spheres of government. The MTES for the
years 2009 to 2014 committed the government to
“faster (and more inclusive) economic growth, decent
work and sustainable livelihoods” (National Treasury
2009: 7, emphasis added). While endorsing the
Second Economy Strategy, the MTES focused
only on one element – the expanded public works
programme. By 2015, no mention had been made
either of the second economy or the informal sector
(National Treasury 2015).

The idea of the informal sector as the “second
economy” elicited a flurry of critical responses
from analysts (Aliber et al 2006, Devey et al 2006b,
du Toit and Neves 2007). The primary criticism
was the conceptual flaw of seeing the formal and

The National Development Plan gives particular
primacy to small business, targeting the creation of
11 million jobs by 2030 and arguing that 90% of
these new jobs will be created by SMMEs (National
Planning Commission, 2012:121). Depending on

10
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the scenario, the plan projects that the informal
sector will create around 2 million of these jobs.
But the NDP says little or nothing about how
existing operators in the informal sector will be
supported, nor how existing barriers to entry will
be eliminated to generate these new jobs (Fourie
2015). Specific proposals to create “a more enabling
environment for small enterprises” and “conditions under which start-ups can flourish” include
(a) simplifying the regulatory environment; (b)
creating financial instruments (debt and equity
finance); (c) establishing small-business support
services; and (d) addressing the entrepreneurship
skills gaps. However, these proposals are mainly
relevant for formal sector small and medium enterprises. In May 2014, the President announced the
establishment of the Department of Small Business
Development (DSBD) as a response to the NDP’s
focus on small business.

to it being sent back for redrafting and a revised version has still not been tabled.

Even before the DSBD was established, it was clear
that national government was keen to regulate the
informal sector and in 2013 it released the draft
Licensing of Businesses Bill (DTI 2013). The draft
Bill specified that anyone involved in business activities – no matter how small – would need a licence.
Foreign migrants could only be licensed if they first
received a business permit under the Immigration
Act or a refugee permit under the Refugees Act.
Business permits must be applied for in the country
of origin and are only granted if the applicant can
demonstrate that they have ZAR2.5 million to
invest in South Africa. Few, if any, of the crossborder traders and migrant entrepreneurs currently
operating in South Africa’s informal economy
would qualify. The draft Bill was introduced in a
climate of anti-foreign sentiment among officials.
The Deputy Minister of Trade and Industry, for
example, referred to “the scourge of South Africans
in townships selling and renting their businesses to
foreigners unfortunately does not assist us as government in our efforts to support and grow these
informal businesses…You still find many spaza
shops with African names, but when you go in to
buy you find your Mohammeds and most of them
are not even registered” (Thabethe 2013). Widespread public negative reaction to the draft Bill led

On the positive side, this was the first time the DTI
focused explicitly on the informal sector. While
NIBUS proposes to tackle the two critical needs of
infrastructure and skills development, there is also
cause for concern. First, the policy targets “entrepreneurial activities in the informal economy” (our
emphasis). Second, “business upliftment” targets
entrepreneurial activity in the informal economy.
Combined with an emphasis on “graduation” to
the formal economy, these policies run the risk
of “picking winners” and neglecting the majority
of informal operators. The policy approach is also
driven by an underlying anti-immigrant sentiment,
referring to a “foreign trader challenge”; noting
that “there is evidence of violence and unhappiness
of local communities with regard to the takeover of
local business by foreign nationals”; and asserting
that there are “no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners” (NIBUS 2013: 10,
22). NIBUS (2013) then approvingly highlights the
example of Ghana where a raft of regulatory controls restrict the economic activities of international
migrants.

In March 2014, the Department of Trade and
Industry launched the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS), the first postapartheid nationally coordinated policy approach to
the informal sector (DTI 2014). NIBUS has two
key delivery arms – the Shared Economic Infrastructure Facility (SEIF) and the Informal Business
Upliftment Facility (IBUF). SEIF provides funding
for new infrastructure, and upgrading or maintaining of existing infrastructure shared by informal
businesses. IBUF focuses on skills development,
promotional material, product improvement, technology support, equipment, and help with registration, and is being piloted by training 1,000 informal
traders in partnership with the Wholesale and Retail
Sector Education and Training Authority.

The anti-foreign sentiment reinforces a generally punitive approach to the informal sector that
focuses on regulation and control (Crush et al
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2015a; Rogerson, 2016a). The November 2015
report of the parliamentary committee which
investigated xenophobic attacks that targeted
immigrants working informally, recommended
the regulation of township businesses. The report
states, for example, that municipal governments
must improve systems for providing and monitoring business permits, noting a “tendency of
issuing too many licences” to businesses operating
out of residential dwellings, many of which do not
comply with municipal by-laws (Parliament of
South Africa 2015: 38-39). This is likely to have
negative consequences for both South African and
immigrant informal operators.
None of the policy documents referred to above
make any reference to the role that the informal
sector plays in food security. The Second Economy
strategy suggests there could be incentives for
home-based food production (Philip 2009: 11),
but NIBUS makes no reference to food. While the
NDP pays considerable attention to food security,
the informal sector’s role in facilitating food access
is not mentioned.

Provincial and City Responses
South African provinces are mandated by the 1993
amendment to the Businesses Act to play a role
in regulating and supporting the informal sector,
but have been slow in addressing the issue. After
an eight-year process, KwaZulu-Natal produced
an Informal Economy Policy in 2011, but this still
has not been developed into a White Paper (KZN
2011). The Western Cape released an Informal
Sector Framework in 2014, while Gauteng released
the Gauteng Informal Business Development
Strategy in 2015 (Gauteng 2015, Western Cape
2014). Only the Western Cape Framework makes
reference to the informal sector’s role in food security, noting research that informal traders are able
to provide superior quality products at lower prices
than their giant retail counterparts (City of Cape
Town 2014: 12).

12

While all of these documents make a commitment to supporting the informal sector, their
actual implementation requires further scrutiny. In
KwaZulu-Natal, for example, the thrust has been
to form and fund the KZN Provincial Association of Traders and traders’ training academies in
various districts. At the launch of the initiative, a
Member of the Executive Council (MEC) stated
that “we have to bring back our general dealer
stores that used to be seen in our townships and villages. Those stores no longer exist and those that
do have been sold to foreign nationals. This association is aimed at renewing those stores. We need to
bring back our businesses. We don’t have to be violent, we have to create a business strategy that will
cater for everyone. The government has allocated
R3 million, which will assist bigger and smaller business, including informal traders” (News24 2015).
This suggests that the provincial government aims
to “level the playing fields” between South African
and immigrant operators; an implication not seen
in the official KZN Informal Economy Policy.
While local level policy statements also affirm the
positive contribution of the informal economy,
implementation often contradicts policy. The City
of Johannesburg’s (2009: 3) street trading policy
states that “informal trading is a positive development in the micro business sector as it contributes
to the creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty
and has the potential to expand further the City’s
economic base.” In practice, the City has long been
ambivalent, if not actively hostile, to the informal
economy (Rogerson, 2016b; Wafer 2011). In late
2013, the City Council violently removed and confiscated the stock of about 6,000 inner-city street
traders, many of them migrants. A group of traders
took the City to court and in April 2014 the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour. Acting Chief
Justice Moseneke stated that the operation (named
Operation Clean Sweep) was an act of “humiliation
and degradation” and that City’s attitude “may well
border on the cynical.” Street traders have returned
to the streets but their future remains uncertain.
The City recently commissioned a project to consider alternatives, while simultaneously seeking to



THE INFORMAL SECTOR’S ROLE IN FOOD SECURITY: A MISSING LINK IN POLICY DEBATES?

declare large inner city areas restricted and prohibited trade zones.
The City of Cape Town’s (2013: 8) policy advocates a “thriving informal trading sector that is
valued and integrated into the economic life, urban
landscape and social activities within the City of
Cape Town.” In practice, the City seems to use less
draconian tactics than in Johannesburg, but instead
relies on more systemic policies of exclusion, as
exemplified by its allocation of only 410 streettrading bays in the whole inner city and ongoing
harassment of traders throughout the city (Bukasa
2014, SA Breaking News 2013, Schroeder 2012).
Although the policy environment differs in different
parts of the city and between different segments of
the informal economy, the modernist vision of a
“world-class city” (with its associated antipathy to
informality) predominates, and informal space and
activity is accordingly pathologized.
Durban was once hailed as having a relatively progressive stance on the informal economy (Dobson
and Skinner 2009, Lund and Skinner 2004). A
progressive informal economy policy was unanimously accepted by the Council in 2001 and is still
the official policy. However, the Council’s actions
reflect a more ambivalent approach. For example,
in 2009 the Council approved a mall development
at the inner-city transport node of Warwick Junction that threatened 6,000 traders and was only
halted by a legal challenge (Skinner 2010). In 2013,
traders in both the inner city and outlying areas
identified harassment by the police as the key business challenge (Dube et al 2013). In 2015, traders
won a legal case challenging the constitutionality of
confiscating their goods, forcing the City to redraft
the street trader by-laws. Again, the courts were the
final recourse.
Analysis of references to food in the informal trade/
economy policies of Cape Town, Durban and
Johannesburg reveal that none mention the role
of informal retailers in food security. Food is only
mentioned when the policies refer to the need to
regulate food sellers in terms of food safety and
hygiene. However, reviews of the toxicology of
South African street foods have found that street

food vendors in South Africa are capable of producing relatively safe foods with low bacterial counts
(Lues et al 2006, Mboganie Mwangi et al 2001, von
Holy and Makhoane 2006). Public health concerns
are often used to justify removing informal traders.
Municipalities that seek to remove traders are meant
to (but often do not) provide suitable infrastructure
and services to make hygienic provision for street
foods. The practice of highlighting health concerns
when they are responsible for the infrastructure that
could defray health issues is a major contradiction.

Conclusion
This discussion paper argues that the informal
economy is a vital, if not the main, means by which
the poor in South Africa attain a measure of food
security. However, the national, regional and local
policy environment for informal operators in South
Africa is at best benign neglect and at worst actively
destructive, especially for migrants and refugees. If
policy approaches do not formally recognize the
importance of the informal sector, the negative
consequences will be shrinking employment, a
greater reliance on a resource-poor state, growing
food insecurity and extra burdens on the state and
society.
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